Canadian Consortium on Human Security

The Illusion of Openness

In some ways Lebanon is an extremely accessible place in which to conduct scholarly research – especially if it concerns politics . Unlike many countries in the region there is a great deal of openness when it comes to discussing political issues which makes engaging people in conversation about current events easy and often enjoyable. It is, as many Lebanese will tell you, a sort of ‘national pastime’.

As a small country, but one that receives a great deal of international attention and funds, it is not uncommon to cross paths if not actually talk with active, high-level or well-known figures in international politics – whether they be with international agencies, governments or NGOs. The same is true for domestic political figures. Getting an interview with a past president, first lady, or the sister of the deceased prime minister, for example, is all within the realm of the possible in Lebanon. Moreover, getting the contact information for these individuals is frequently easy. Often, the needed names and numbers are volunteered at the end of an interview, with the additional offer to use that person’s name as an entry point. This type of research experience is not uncommon. This level of openness, however, has its limitations and challenges.

A Research Saturated Society

Since the country is flooded with foreign journalists, academics, international agencies and NGOs, meetings may be easily obtained. There are, however, limits to the type of information you can collect. It is not inconceivable that the person you are speaking to has spoken to half a dozen other researchers that week alone – some of whom may have frighteningly similar research projects to yours. This can at times mean, somewhat understandably, that the answers to your questions sound rehearsed. It can also make achieving a genuine level of engagement much more difficult. Foreign researchers come and go and most do not return. Establishing longer-lasting ties with people and informants simply requires time. One woman apologetically explained to me that she had invested much time in speaking with researchers - Western ones in particular - in the hopes that they would be able to broadcast a “more accurate and nuanced” understanding of the issues to their own constituencies. But time and time again she was disappointed to find that they would either misrepresent the situation - in her view -, or just disappear never to be heard from again. Her policy therefore, was to grant interviews if she was more certain that the interviewer seemed to have a long term and genuine investment in the issues.

The limits of accessibility are that although you may get the interview, you may not get the information you seek. Just about anyone will meet with you, but what they are willing to divulge is another story. This is related to one of the paradoxes of Lebanon in general. It is a country that is deeply divided and to the extent it is able to remain stable, it is in large part due to the agreement between communities not to interfere in each other’s affairs. The Lebanese confessional (i.e.: sectarian) communities may be neighbours in the same land, but they are neighbours with high fences. Yet, it is precisely because of these deep fractures in society that there is a relative freedom and space that exists. Because no one group has been able to achieve hegemony, and because of the agreement that grants each community autonomy over its own functioning, there is the sort of ‘by product’ in the form of socio-political space where things can happen: activism, organization, vocal opinions, liberal styles, materialism, pleasure seeking, etc. It is partly due to this space (and for other reasons described above) researchers in Lebanon are able to meet with a lot of interesting people relatively quickly – this is especially true if you are studying issues of civil society. Exploring the internal dynamics of a given sectarian communities themselves, however, is more challenging and you will find yourself hitting walls more often and more quickly. Thus, it is relatively easy to get a general overview about sectarian dynamics, and the civil society politics, but exploring the internal issues or divisions a particular community may face, and thus gaining a more complete picture of sectarian politics, simply takes a much, much longer time and commitment.

Trying to Verify – Where are the statistics?

Another challenge of conducting research in Lebanon is the difficulty in obtaining reliable statistics and quantitative data. Narrative accounts are fascinating and easy to come by but concrete statistics, actual numbers of members and their confessional identities, are either much more guarded or totally nonexistent.

Official statistics are generally a complicated issue in Lebanon as the country has not collected its own official data in the form of a national census since 1932. The census is politically charged matter because the current political system and distribution of political power among the various sectarian communities hinges on the size of that community’s population –and the current distribution is, as almost everyone knows but may not want to admit, out of sync with current demographic reality. If a national census were to be conducted it would no doubt demonstrate that the Christian minority who has 50 % of the political power in fact represents much less than 50% of the Lebanese population, and the Shi’a with the least political representation of the three main minority groups has the largest population. Indeed, these unbalanced ratios were one of the main causes of the civil war in the early 1970s. Due to the lack of association and national census data as well as various other reasons, systematically reliable data on Lebanon can be difficult to obtain.

This is also true many NGOs, political movements and parties and was often the case with the political parties/movements that I met with. The leaders of the youth wings would verbally explain aspects of their party/movement structures, but because their party was often “under construction” (according to them) verifying the descriptive data with documentation, was not possible (or, at least not on this research trip). The same went for the membership numbers. None of the representatives I met with were able to provide statistics on the actual membership numbers although they all claimed it was in the thousands and growing by the day. Moreover, no one was able to provide statistics on the confessional identities of these members. The parties I met with attract and are strongly organized along the lines of religious confession. However, many of the representatives went to great pains to emphasize the fact that their party also included young people from other sects. This was to underscore the point that they are “not sectarian”, rather that they stood for issues that were supported by individuals from other religious communities. Again, quantitative data that could verify this was unavailable. When these claims were cross-checked in other interviews, they were often said to be overstated. Still, the fact that many interviewees emphasized this so strongly is a finding in and of itself and raises interesting research questions. Verifying this, however, will take more time and further research.

Unraveling (seeming) Contradictions.

The issue of cross-checking or validating is connected to a related research challenge. I am exploring how and why young people are increasingly drawn into sectarian-based political movements which all accounts seem to point toward. In interviews, however, young people do not speak directly about their sectarianism. In some cases it could be because they are unaware of it, in others it could be because they have learned that the “right” answer (especially to an outsider) is to say that you do not believe in sectarianism. Still others genuinely do not believe in or support the sectarianism they see dividing their country. I suspect it is all of the above.

Whatever the reason, young people espouse a “civic nationalism” in their comments and answers to questions in spite of their increasingly sectarian behaviour. I was frequently told in interviews “it is not us who are sectarian, it is the other side”. Or, “we are Lebanese – we are fighting for all of the people Lebanon”. Unraveling the multiple meaning in these statements is part of my project. It is both a findings as well as a methodological challenge. In 1976, Kamal Jumblatt said this about the Lebanese: “This society is not a society in the real sense of the work because there is no such thing as a Lebanese community. There is no Lebanese social unit. Lebanon is a collection of sects and socio-religious communities. Thus, it is not a society not a community, not a nation. There is no such thing as Lebanese Nationalism.”

My research, however, suggests something different. Part of what I saw among youth was an emerging Lebanese nationalism. Although it is likely only skin deep and lacking is substance, it is still something that is markedly different from the pre-war and war years. The question is how to unravel, both methodologically and theoretically, what seems to be an emergent (albeit shallow) sense of Lebanese nationalism among youth, from their increasingly sectarian behaviour. Indeed, as opposed to uttering sectarian-based sentiment and particularistic religious nationalisms (Shi’a, Maronite, etc.) these young people appear to be competing over what Lebanon is – and for the right to represent it.

My experience observing elections at the American University of Beirut (AUB) is a good example of this. In interviews with student candidates, they often described what at first sounded like ideals of civic Lebanese nationalism. As I watched of the thousands of students who had congregated outside of the main hall at AUB awaiting the election results, it became clearer to me what that actually meant. The students were physically divided into the two coalitions which have Lebanon in its current deadlock: The March 8 coalition (the more or less anti-West coalition) to my left and March 14 (the more or less pro-West coalition) on my right. At one point the March 8 coalition called the March 14 coalition “Zionists” – the ultimate insult, and a jab at their political alignment with the west. The March 14 side, in response, began to sing the Lebanese national anthem.

“They are asserting their Lebanese identity” a reporter told me. So, in response, what did the March 8 side do? They begin singing the Lebanese National anthem too - only louder. What transpired was, in effect, a national anthem “sing-off” between these young Lebanese; each side competing to be more Lebanese than their counterparts; each side mimicking, learning and practicing the sectarian divisions of the old political elite. Each side with competing answers to the question: “Which Lebanon will prevail?”

This is a fascinating aspect of the study but also one that presents the challenge of designing extremely careful interview questions that are able to distinguish and unravel seemingly contradictory information about how youth understand their country.

In conclusion

These fieldwork issues present both challenges and opportunities to my ongoing research in Lebanon. In a sense, what the above discussion is describing is a series of paradoxes that also typify Lebanon itself, i.e.: deep societal divisions that, perhaps ironically, result in a high degree of accessibility and relative openness. It also engenders increasing sectarianism which results in an emergent, although shallow, Lebanese nationalism. These paradoxes are fascinating and methodologically challenging. More crucially perhaps, what these fieldwork challenges reveal is not just challenges to methodological design but the incompleteness of the theorizing at this stage in my research. Indeed, what is becomes clear from the above discussion - and what I am confronting in my own research is the necessity of having a methodology that supports and emerges from a strong theoretical framework. This is the next step in my research: theorizing what these puzzles say about youth in sectarian societies. Taking this step will assist in sorting out the methodological challenges (particularly about the issues concerning ‘emergent nationalism’) that I face with a project that is, thus far, heavily reliant on interview data. The difficulty in obtaining statistical data makes interviews a key source of information. Yet, designing them is a delicate art particularly in a place where paradox and contradiction is the modus operandi.