Canadian Consortium on Human Security

Arne Strand*

When travelling with NGOs in Afghanistan in recent years I have often questioned why things have changed so dramatically. Why have NGOs become military targets and why has their reputation declined compared to the situation in the 1980s and 1990s. Why were people not coming out to greet us when upon arrival in a village, as they always did in the past?

Perceptions of the international community

There may be a number of reasons, but much derives from perceptions held amongst ordinary Afghans of the various international players to which they are exposed. Certainly, they are disappointed by the international community in general as expectations of a better and more secure life have not yet materialised. Much of the attention has been focused on inadequate delivery of humanitarian assistance, but research has demonstrated that the cooptation of former warlords and a significantly deteriorated security environment are important contributing factors to the increasingly negative attitude of the Afghans.[i] From a human security viewpoint the situation is especially grave for women. Large numbers of cases of self-immolation are being recorded at hospitals in Herat, while violence and rape are reported mainly to the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC). The principal reason for the lack of reported cases as explained in an interview in Kandahar in 2005 is that: '...there is no use reporting to the police, they don't care; the AIHRC is at least willing to take note of our case'.[ii] As recently documented in northern Afghanistan, many find the police to be a threat to their security rather than a force of protection. Likewise, people find many governmental officials to be deeply corrupt and involved in a range of illegal activities. They then wonder why this is allowed to happen when there are numerous foreign advisers training and working with the Afghan National Police, the Afghan Army and the ministries.

Blurring of lines

Another reason for Afghans to take a more cautious attitude towards humanitarian agencies is that the lines between humanitarian and military interventions have been blurred. In November 2002, the US military introduced Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) and the notion of 'winning hearts and minds' as a military strategy through implementation of humanitarian projects in areas under their control. To support these plans and as a means of force protection US troops tried to associate themselves closely with any humanitarian and development activity under way. One such way was the use of white cars to capitalise on the humanitarian profile of NGOs and UN agencies.

This has turned NGOs into targets for military groups opposing the international military presence and portrayed projects such as new school buildings as symbols of foreign interference, not unlike how they were perceived during the Soviet invasion. While some NGOs capitalised on this new funding opportunity, the majority protested on grounds of principle. Out of fear for their security they advocated a clear separation between humanitarian and military interventions.[iii] While the US continued its dual strategy in the south, other nations that were part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) opted for a clearer separation between their military and humanitarian engagements, following the example of British troops in Northern Afghanistan. However, due to the lack of a common ISAF policy, each PRT nation was left to develop its own approach subject to its military and humanitarian strategy and depending on the funds it had available.[iv]

Regaining trust

Research undertaken in different parts of Afghanistan over recent years has allowed a comparison of attitudes towards the international forces and NGOs. A doctor asked rhetorically: '...are the forces here to protect us or themselves?', representing a common scepticism in southern Afghanistan about the aggressive military intervention they have experienced. In the north, by contrast, interviews revealed that ordinary Afghans regarded the international troops as a guarantee against renewed warlordism and warfare, and a sign of continued international engagement. While most experienced NGOs operating in the south have avoided contact with military forces, the separation that has been established between the military and humanitarian agendas in the north has reduced this tension considerably.[v]

Thus, if humanitarian agencies are to regain the trust of the Afghans it remains of crucial importance that they continue to demonstrate their distance from the military forces. For their part, the military forces need to understand and respect this strategy and refrain from using humanitarian symbols and projects. However, there is more to be done. Other findings make it equally clear that the NGOs have a major job to do in informing Afghans of their intentions and their programmes, and to stick to the promises they make. All the signs indicate that they need to reflect critically on their own position. On the one hand, they need to decide whether they just wish to capitalise on available funds and limit themselves to project implementation. On the other, they may choose to side with the Afghan population and voice their concerns against aggressively performed military operations, oppressive and corrupt government officials, humanitarian agencies failing to live up to people's expectations and the violence that particularly affects women. The latter strategy might result in less funding but warmer welcomes in Afghan villages and townships.

[i] Draws on collaborative research with the Afghan based Cooperation for Peace and Unity for the What Kind of Peace is Possible? project, presentation made at International Conference, Vilankulo, Mozambique, November 20-21, 2005.

[ii] Interview for ‘Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan, 2001-05 from Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom. A Joint Evaluation. Copenhagen, Danida

[iii] See for example Barbara J. Stapleton (2003) A British Agencies Afghanistan Group Briefing Paper on the Development of Joint Regional Teams, Kabul, BAAG

[iv] See Erik Krogh Lauritzen and Gunnar Olesen with Arne Strand (2006) The Role Assignment of External Armed Forces in Societal Reconstruction, available at http://www.cmi.no/afghanistan/?id=278&Civilian---Military-Relations

[v] See Agency Coordination Body of Afghan Relief (ACBAR) Brief to the Security Council, 13 November 2006, available at http://www.acbar.org/downloads.php

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