What's Driving U.S. Policy toward Sudan?

Lisa Rogoff*

In April 2005, Sallah Abdallah Gosh - one of the key architects of the Darfur genocide and a cohort of Osama bin Laden during his time in Khartoum - made his journey to CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia on a pre-arranged private jet. He was flown in by the U.S. government to participate in high-level meetings on U.S. counterterrorism initiatives.[i]

As head of Sudan’s security, Gosh is responsible for the unleashing of Arab militias, known as the Janjaweed, onto the non-Arab civilians of Darfur, fueling a counterinsurgency that has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives and displaced millions. Over the past four years the conflict has evolved as a result of the divide-and-rule tactics of the Sudanese government. The two main rebel groups have splintered into several different factions that not only fight against the Janjaweed but also attack each other and target innocent civilians. As noted in ENOUGH’s June field report [ii] Khartoum has authorized the Janjaweed to broaden their targets to include not only non-Arab tribes such as the Fur, Zaghawa, and Massaliet, but also other Arabs, in an effort to claim land as compensation for their work as Khartoum’s proxy militia.

Three years ago, the United States Congress declared the violence in Darfur a “genocide” – as did President Bush – and demanded that those such as Gosh pull back on the reigns of the counterinsurgency militia.

The violence and destruction of livelihoods continues to grow as the U.S. government courts the government of Sudan in exchange for what it deems to be significant counterterrorism intelligence. This enemy-with-benefits approach is not only morally irresponsible, but dangerous.

Darfur continues to burn, the peace agreement in southern Sudan teeters on the brink of failure, and neighboring countries are struggling to deal with mounting regional instability and internal unrest. Meanwhile, the Bush Administration has maintained close ties with Gosh and others in the ruling National Congress Party (NCP) as allies in the “war on terror,” despite evidence that some in Khartoum may have re-established ties with old terrorist cronies [iii]. Based on the record of American inaction, the Khartoum Government knows that our bark will not be followed by bite.

President Bush’s long awaited “Plan B” for Darfur, announced this past May, was a mere slap on the wrist with unilateral punitive measures targeting just three of the perpetrators. As argued in ENOUGH’s Strategy Briefing, “A Plan B with Teeth for Darfur” the President’s plan will remain toothless unless its sanctions and economic pressures are multilaterally implemented at the UN [iv]. The U.S. and other governments with intelligence in Sudan should also provide information to help the International Criminal Court execute and broaden its indictment process[v].

The primary impediment to effective American action in Darfur is that the U.S. government has other priorities in Iraq and Afghanistan, and thus is not willing to expend the political capital on halting the genocide. However, this does not excuse the Bush Administration’s active collaboration with the architects of the violence in Darfur. The United States needs to get out of bed with the NCP and lay down the rules. While pursuing counter-terrorism issues is critical for our national security, we cannot trade the lives of innocent Darfuris for this intelligence. Achieving peace in Darfur, which goes hand-in-hand with successful implementation of the peace agreement in the South, requires a comprehensive and cohesive Sudan policy.

Establishing a new relationship with Khartoum will not be easy or without sacrifice, but by working multilaterally to enforce ENOUGH’s three P strategy – peacekeeping, protection, and punishment – the U.S. may finally begin heading in the right direction. With Sudan focused on oil revenue, Islamist ideology is not driving the NCP’s policy. By working with other countries to increase economic pressures, the U.S. will gain leverage and, if the past is any example, will see results from Khartoum. Sudan’s economy relies on China to purchase the majority of its oil, in turn, making China a major player in Sudan’s policy decisions. With the 2008 Olympics approaching and Beijing’s concern about its image increasing, the time is ripe to demand that China use its influence with Khartoum to bring change to Darfur[vi].

In order to make meaningful progress in Darfur, the U.S. government must appoint full-time high-level envoys to Sudan while engaging multilaterally with other countries such as France and the UK. In addition, U.S. citizens must continue to demand that Darfur is a priority as the 2008 presidential primaries take shape.

According to Foreign Policy Magazine, Sudan not only tops the list of failed states but seems to be dragging its neighbors down with it[vii]. Climbing into bed with a genocidal regime heading a failed state runs counter to our priority of halting terrorism and is exactly the kind of behavior that will leave the U.S. vulnerable and alone in the global community. Instead of cozying up with war criminals like Sallah Abdallah Gosh, we must start standing up for the real victims. If the U.S. is truly dedicated to influencing Khartoum and helping the people of Darfur, it must employ much greater international pressure, principally in the form of United Nations Security Council sanctions and robust diplomacy. In order to help the millions of Darfuris who have been chased from their homes U.S. policy must start anew, based on the understanding that conflict resolution and good governance are the best counterterrorism strategies.

[i] “Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America’s War on Terrorism.” Los Angeles Times opinion-editorial. Ken Silverstein. April 29, 2005.

[ii] “Darfur Monthly Report.” May/June 2007.

[iii] “Blowing the Horn.” Foreign Affairs. John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen. March/April 2007.

[iv] “A Plan B with Teeth for Darfur.” ENOUGH Strategy Paper #2. John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen. May 2007.

[v] “Shooting Blanks at Sudan.” ENOUGH Strategy Briefing #2. John Prendergast, Colin Thomas-Jensen and Julia Spiegel. May 2007.

[vi] “Blowing the Horn.” Foreign Affairs. John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen. March/April 2007.

[vii] “The Failed State Index 2007.” Foreign Policy Magazine. The Fund for Peace and the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. July/August 2007.

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