Canadian Consortium on Human Security

Gayle Smith*

Perhaps no other foreign policy challenge has garnered more attention and less action in the United States than has the ongoing crisis in Sudan’s western Darfur region. Policymakers frequently evoke Darfur as evidence of their concern for the plight of its innocent victims and principled stance against gross human rights abuses. Darfur has even made its way into the presidential debates, where it offers candidates a platform for proving their willingness to use America’s diplomatic and military strength to right a daunting moral wrong.

But U.S. policy towards Darfur is strikingly anemic, crafted to accrue minimal risk and incur limited cost, and devoid of the vigor that characterizes speeches and statements emanating from the White House and State Department. The net result is that Washington has failed to deploy either smart diplomacy or adequate resources to end a crisis that threatens the lives of millions and the stability of east and central Africa. But beyond its ineffectiveness, the striking feature of the Bush Administration’s Darfur policy is that it is driven almost entirely by contextual factors.

First, any forward progress on Washington’s Darfur policy is the product not of enlightenment on the part of the White House, but of pressure from the public and the Congress. Since the crisis erupted into worldwide public view in 2003, Congress has taken the lead – in calling for action, in labeling the crisis genocide, in legislating the expenditure of resources to fund the African Union mission, and in demanding that the Khartoum regime be held into account.

While this consistent and bipartisan legislative activism is driven in part by the sincere commitment of a growing number of Congressional leaders, its main source of power and support comes from the American public, which has organized a robust, diverse and persistent movement dedicated to forcing its leaders to end the crisis in Darfur. On the positive side of the balance sheet, the combination of an effective movement and a responsive Congress has pushed Darfur policy in the right direction, and forced the White House to take the few steps it has taken.

But as the frailty of U.S. policy makes clear, the negative side of the balance sheet dominates. This is largely because the decisions emanating from the White House are not the product of considered deliberations about Darfur, but are instead considered reactions to a host of other imperatives that have little or nothing to do with ending mass atrocities in a far corner of east Africa.

The first and most potent factor is Iraq. As is made clear by the Bush Administration’s failure to take on peace in the Middle East, stunning inattention to Latin America, and apparent nonchalance towards a host of other foreign policy challenges, Iraq dominates the attention of the Bush White House to the detriment of almost all other international issues. At a practical level, America’s over-extension in Iraq means that the administration has few resources at hand – the State Department’s top diplomats are consumed by Iraq, the U.S. military is dangerously overstretched by Iraq, and the federal budget has been busted by Iraq. But even more important than the practical constraints imposed by the debacle that is the U.S. intervention in Iraq is the fact that senior policymakers are both unable and unwilling to devote serious time and effort to grappling with policy challenges like that of Darfur.

The second impediment is the narrowly-defined “war on terror,” a strategy that trumps any other foreign policy perspective and shapes each and every foreign policy measure pursued by the Bush Administration. Sudan fits neatly into this strategy, albeit to the detriment of its people. Shortly after the attacks of September 11th, Sudan was often mentioned by pundits and policymakers as one of the top state sponsors of terrorism. Khartoum responded by offering to cooperate with Washington, and began sharing intelligence that the Bush Administration claims is both credible and actionable.

A new intelligence-sharing relationship was born and led to frequent exchanges between top counter-terrorism officials – including repeated visits to Washington and CIA headquarters by Sudan’s intelligence chief, Salah Gosh. Though the Bush Administration denies that Khartoum’s role as a partner in the war on terror affects Darfur policy, the evidence suggests otherwise, as the White House has consistently, since 2003, avoided any robust actions or measures against Khartoum, opting instead to make the occasional critical statement and dilute the blame by pointing a finger at the janjaweed militia, equating the actions of the regime and the rebels, and condemning the UN for failing to resolve the crisis.

Third, and though the concept of human security has gained increasing credence in Canada, Europe and the developing world, U.S. foreign policy is still driven by a singular focus on national security. The net result is that the plight and rights of Darfur’s people do not rise to the level of attention needed to generate meaningful action. Fourth and finally, Washington’s Darfur policy is hindered by the Bush Administration’s active disdain for multilateralism, whether expressed by its antipathy for the UN or its failure to work with allies to bring the crisis to an end.

The net result is that U.S. policy towards Darfur is comprised of a series of half measures. Since late last year, the White House has threatened that Khartoum’s opposition to a robust peacekeeping force risked U.S. sanctions – but months after Khartoum missed repeated deadlines, President Bush declined to honor his threat, and instead opted to repeat it. Arguably, that failure to match rhetoric with action delayed agreement on the deployment of a force by many months. And even as Washington supported the recent UN Security Council resolution authorizing a hybrid UN/African Union peacekeeping mission, it failed to undertake the skillful and sustained diplomacy required to ensure that the resolution included a mechanism for holding Khartoum accountable if and when it restricts deployment.

The search for a just and durable peace agreement has been similarly hindered by Washington’s unwillingness to invest meaningful diplomatic time and resources, the apparent desire to avoid angering Khartoum, and an unwillingness to coordinate with allies in support of the peace process, as was done in the case of Southern Sudan. Instead, Washington’s investment in a peace agreement is comprised of a part-time envoy operating without the benefit of the diplomatic capital of senior American officials.

Looking back on its Darfur policy, Bush Administration officials will claim that they stood on the right side of history – that they condemned the violence, that they supported the African Union, that they demanded a robust peacekeeping mission, and that they invested in peace. What they won’t say is that their condemnation of the crisis was in response to a demand from Congress and the public; that increased funding for the African Union materialized only when Congress legislated that it be so; that they did not actively support a new peacekeeping force until Khartoum allowed it; and that their peace envoy was appointed only when the clamor from the public and Congress grew unbearable.

On the downside, the failure of the Bush Administration to elevate and act on Darfur has allowed the crisis to escalate and spread. It has legitimized, rather than confronted, the authority of the Sudanese regime. The only upside is that Washington’s flawed policy is unfolding in plain sight of a diverse and relentless citizenry that has organized itself into a capable and persistent movement. As the administration resists meaningful action, that movement is forcing it to take small but meaningful steps towards ending the crisis in Darfur. Sadly, the administration is not being dragged along fast enough to stop the crisis in its tracks. But importantly, this administration and its successors are on the receiving end of a clear message that will shape America’s response to the Darfurs of the future.