Canadian Consortium on Human Security

Alana Tiemessen and Erin Williams*

In the court of public opinion, China has been cast in both the villain’s and the hero’s role in stemming the atrocities in Darfur. The most virulent critics have tried to hit Beijing where it hurts: by labeling the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing the “Genocide Olympics”, in reference to China’s alleged role in facilitating the atrocities against Darfuri civilians. Prendergast and Thomas-Jensen of the ENOUGH Project recently joined a growing list of celebrities and activists when they warned that these atrocities, “paid for by Chinese investment, perpetrated with Chinese weapons, and protected by Chinese diplomatic cover” could very well become a “dark cloud” over the 2008 Olympics.[i] In contrast, other observers have deemed China’s influence in Sudan as “helpful”[ii] and have even gone so far as to call China an unlikely, if unwitting, “champion” of human rights in Darfur.[iii] Unpacking the different dimensions of the China-Sudan relationship suggests that there is a ring of truth to both positions. The international community has come to better understand this relationship and appreciate China’s need to play more the hero and less the villain for Darfur. The end result has been a move away from playing leveraging games with Sudan, to leveraging the Games with China.

What’s in it for China?

China’s relationship with Sudan hinges on two main objectives. The first is material: China’s quest to secure access to oil. While Sudanese oil comprises only 6% of China’s total imports,[iv] this seemingly small amount is significant given the extent to which China’s continued economic growth, and by extension its domestic stability, depends on access to international energy sources. Moreover, tight international competition for these energy sources makes Beijing determined not to lose any of its suppliers.

The second objective is political: China’s goal of becoming a respected global power and counterweight to Western hegemony. Specifically, China wants to use its own developing country status and non-interventionist foreign policy as a form of ‘soft power’ that will bolster its position as leader of the non-Western world. With 53 states, the entire African continent figures prominently in China’s pursuit of this objective.

What’s in it for Sudan?

Sudan also has clear material and political incentives to maintain good relations with China. First, the economic relationship results in a net gain for Sudan, not least of all because nearly 65% of its total oil exports are sold to the Chinese market, and because the Chinese have invested in high profile projects, such as an oil pipeline.[v] Additionally, China’s ‘no strings attached’ aid and loan packages are preferred by Khartoum as they come without the human rights and governance conditions often imposed by Western countries. In February, for example, China provided Sudan with an interest-free loan of $12.8 million and a grant of $40 million for various projects[vi], while the Western world has labeled the Khartoum government an international pariah.

Second, Sudan benefits politically from having an ally on the United Nations Security Council. Some Security Council members have proposed tough measures to isolate, punish, and humiliate Khartoum. As the UN goes through its menu of options for conflict resolution, China has been both obstructive and decidedly strategic.

Conflict Resolution: Oil, Guns, or Boots on the Ground?

Oil Sanctions: China has vigorously obstructed any Security Council action to impose aggressive and effective sanctions against Sudan.[vii] If oil were the only leverage in this relationship, then Chinese-backed sanctions against oil exports would be an expeditious solution. But sanctions have had a poor track record in conflict resolution, and imposing them could ultimately hinder peace by removing an important bargaining chip in negotiations.

Weapons Embargo: A 2006 Amnesty International report contained damning evidence that the Sudanese military and Janjaweed militia were both using Chinese military hardware to commit atrocities against civilians in Darfur. The accusation implicated China as a spoiler in the UN-imposed weapons embargo against Darfur.[viii] China is not technically in violation, however, since the embargo does not apply to weapons sales to the Sudanese government. Moreover, Russia, also a Security Council member, has also sold significant amounts of military hardware to Sudan’s military.

Direct Intervention: In 2005, China abstained from voting on a UN Security Council Resolution that referred the Darfur situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC), as well as on another Resolution in 2006 authorizing a Chapter VII mandate to deploy troops as part of a UN-African Union hybrid force.[ix] But in a recent turn of events, China made a subtle shift away from its role as a strategic broker by voting for Security Council Resolution 1769, authorizing 26,000 troops to be deployed to Darfur (albeit with a concession that withdrew the threat of sanctions)[x]. While Khartoum continues to reject the ICC’s jurisdiction, it has agreed to the terms of Resolution 1769, a diplomatic coup for which China is claiming credit. What explains the international community’s ability to get China to change its tune on non-intervention and use its leverage with Sudan?

China: the Accidental Hero?

By continuing to engage with Khartoum, China painted itself into a corner. It certainly did not welcome close international scrutiny of its relationship with Sudan, and has been rankled, if not outraged, by the ability of some outspoken individuals to associate the Beijing Olympics with the word ‘genocide’. But what was increasingly seen as a public relations fiasco for Beijing has instead become an opportunity to step into its role as a responsible international player. This is not to overstate the extent to which China has altered its thinking on intervention in other states. Beijing voted for Resolution 1769 with the provision that sanctions are taken off the table, thereby safeguarding its own interests in Sudan and preserving an element of its non-interference doctrine. Furthermore, the conclusion to be drawn from this is not that China has become more sensitive to Western criticism of its human rights practices; instead, the real concern was with how its relationship with Sudan would be interpreted within the rest of Africa, and in the non-Western world more generally.

The Darfur predicament illustrates the fact that China’s relationship with Sudan is part of a much larger strategic picture of China engaging with the entire African continent. China’s interests in Africa go well beyond Sudan. Africa has many of the natural resources that China needs to fuel its economic development and African support in international forums is essential to its emergence as a non-Western global power. Alternatively, some skeptics remain nervous about whether China’s priorities come at a high cost for stability in Africa. As such, Sudan has become a test case for whether China’s deepening relationship with Africa is as “win-win” as the diplomatic rhetoric suggests, or as predacious and asymmetric as colonialism was.

 

[i] John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, “An Axis of Peace for Darfur: The Untied States, France, and China.” The ENOUGH Project Press Release. June 18, 2007. [http://www.allafrica.com]

[ii] Andrew Natsios, the US special envoy for Sudan, as quoted in The Financial Times. “US defends China’s role in Darfur.” April 11, 2007. [http://www.ft.com]

[iii] Stephanie T. Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, “China, the Unlikely Human Rights Champion.” Policy Innovations: A Program of the Carnegie Council. February 14, 2007. [http://www.policyinnovations.org]; Gareth Evans and Donald Steinberg. “China and Darfur: ‘Signs of Transition.’ Guardian Unlimited. June 11, 2007. [http://www.crisisgroup.org]

[iv] Yitzhak Shichor. “China’s Darfur Policy.” China Brief, Vol. VII, Issue 7 (April 5, 2007), p5. [http://www.jamestownfoundation.org]

[v] Esther Pan. “China, Africa and Oil.” Council on Foreign Relations. January 26, 2007. [http://www.cfr.org]; F. William Engdahl. “Darfur, forget genocide, there’s oil.” Asia Times. May 25, 2007. [http:///www.atimes.com]

[vi] Sudan Tribune. “China, Sudan strengthen economic ties.” February 2, 2007; BBC News. “Chinese leader boosts Sudan ties.” February 2, 2007.

[vii] BBC News. “China, Russia bar Sudan sanctions”. April 18, 2006; BBC News. “Chinese leader boosts Sudan ties.” February 2, 2007.

[viii] Amnesty International. People’s Republic of China Sustaining Conflict and Human Rights Abuses: The Flow of Arms Accelerates. June 11, 2006 [http://www.amnesty.org]

[ix] For Resolution 1593, see United Nations Security Council. “Security Council Refers Situation in Darfur, Sudan to Prosecutor of International Criminal Court.” Press Release SC/835. March 31, 2005. For Resolution 1706, see United Nations Security Council. “Security Council Expands Mandate of UN Mission in Sudan to Include Darfur.” Press Release SC/8821. August 31, 2006.

[x] Evelyn Leopold (Reuters). “U.N. approves Darfur force of up to 26,000”. The Globe and Mail. July 31, 2007; BBC News. “Sudan ‘will support Darfur force’. August 1, 2007.

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